



Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons



MUNEXT

Modelo de Naciones Unidas de la Universidad Externado de Colombia

Greetings from the Academic Director

Dear Delegates,
I extend a warm welcome, from the General Secretariat, to MUNEXT 2020. My name is Johann Sebastian Botello Rincón, graduated from the law school of the University Externado de Colombia; great lover of literature, history, videogames, and in general art in all its forms; I have also dedicated my passion in the last 5 years to the United Nations models, in which I have found the ideal spaces to materialize the academy and the knowledge acquired, but also to improve in personal aspects. For me, they have been the spaces that have allowed me to help understand me and the society in which I live, and in my role as Academic Director I aspire to grant all those attending the Third Version of the United Nations Model of the University Externado de Colombia, that same experience.

In this sense, and with the help of my great team of undersecretaries, we have put forth our greatest efforts to build a challenging academic event, demanding in Competition and rewarding personally. Without further ado, I leave you to enter the dynamics of the international system, meddle in the negotiations at the regional level, debate the national reality, lucubrate over the legal disputes, enter the battlefields of the past, and live first Hand the dynamization that awaits you. With the greatest joy in the world, welcome to MUNEXT 2020!

Cordially,

Johann Sebastian Botello Rincon
Academic director.

Greetings from the Undersecretary

Respected delegates,

My name is Juan Manuel Rojas Cardona, I am 19 years old and Law student at Externado University of Colombia. For this version of MUNEXT, I perform the role of Joint General Undersecretary for the committees of the United Nations Organization.

My beginnings within UN Models go back to 2015, on my school, Gimnasio Los Andes. Since then, I have had the opportunity of performing multiple roles, finding great-inspiring friendships, meeting astonishing human beings and obtaining a remarkable personal development. Being that said, I want to take a moment and render the proper acknowledge towards those who have contributed to my own construction and have demonstrated their unconditionality and everlasting support.

It is certainly an honor and a privilege to be leading this Undersecretary this year, not only for the skilled, human and capable team that is boosting it; but because for this MUNEXT edition, it stands out with five exceptional committees which have been designed for representing a challenge and bringing closer its participants to the current international scenario, all of that, from the perspective of such questioned

organism as the United Nations.

Along these lines, I would like to remember all of you that the committees' successfulness rate depends entirely of each one of you. The academic and logistics staff are at your disposal and are indeed a tool for achieving our common goal; nevertheless, their development, within the lines of respect and fair play, is at the discretion of each and every one of you.

I hope you enjoy this experience from the very beginning, and to have as top priority to grow and improve for and to yourselves. I ask you to always be competent people, but not competitive, in order to support us on our labor of rehumanizing the UN Models.

With no more to add, I would love to Spread to all MUNEXT 2020 participants with the humanist philosophy and the radical ethics one would find on the Externado University. It is indeed an open-doors university because we believe that is the way the knowledge deserves to be shared, without any sort of distinction. Moreover, it welcomes you with grand affection and eagerness so if lives allow it, for subsequent occasions.

Sincerely yours,

Juan Manuel Rojas Cardona.

Undersecretary for United Nations.

juan.rojas24@est.uexternado.edu.co

Greetings from the Dais

My name is Sofía Catalina Huertas Romero, I am a second year Law student at the Universidad Externado de Colombia and I will be one of the presidents of your committee. Besides UN Models, I love reading, listening to music, tea, dancing and feminist issues. I have been a part of the world of UN Models since I was very little, and I have kept coming back because I found my passion in them. For this year's committee, I hope you can find a passion as strong as mine in it. I only have left to say that I am thrilled to be your president and I am keen to see you make our committee the best one you've ever experienced.

My name is Julián Huertas Cuello, I am an International Relations student currently coursing third semester in the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana and I will be one of your presidents for this committee. I am really passionate about models of United Nations, and have participated in them since I was 11 years old. Even I can say that they are my biggest passion. However, I have other hobbies, I love playing sports, specifically football, listening to music, specifically punk-rock, also I like to hang around with my friends and clearly party a lot.

This will be my third OPCW committee and therefore it is clear how much I am interested

in chemical weapons and this line of topics, so feel free to reach out for any doubts regarding the Organisation and its functions. I am more than excited to see this committee flourish and with your help, be the best OPCW it can possibly be.

It is with great pleasure that we, as your chair, welcome you to the OPCW committee. If you have any doubts or problems during your preparation process, do not hesitate to contact us. We'll be more than glad to aid you in whatever way possible. We seek to make the committee as pleasant and academically demanding as possible, so we understand if any of you feel the need to reach us. It is important to bear in mind that you delegates are the ones in charge of making the committee: in your hands rest the academic level, the quality of the debate and of the solutions. If you want to have the best possible committee it is necessary then that you prepare as best as you can. We expect that with the resources we've provided for you and the ones you have, you will arrive with an excellent preparation process, ready to astonish us.

Sofía Catalina Huertas Romero
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Introduction to the Committee

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is the implementing body of the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997. This Organisation has different partnerships around the globe with the Chemical Industries, International Organizations and also the United Nations. For instance, the OPCW has been building on years of cooperative work with the chemical industry, and this partnership has taken new form. In 2015, a coordination mechanism was established with the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) through the creation of the OPCW–ICCA Joint Steering Committee, as well as the establishment of the Chemical Industry Coordination Group (CICG). (OPCW, 2015).

Regarding International Organizations and the United Nations, the OPCW has forged other important relationships to advance its mission and implement the Convention. In 2012, OPCW signed an agreement with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to coordinate activities in case of chemical weapon emergencies. In 2017, OPCW and the World Customs Organization (WCO) signed a Memorandum of Understanding that further enhances cooperation between the two organizations to tighten national and international controls on the trade of toxic chemicals. (OPCW, n.d.)

Relevance of the Committee in the United Nations System

The OPCW is a really important International Organization (IO) because it is the only IO that treats Chemical Weapons matters and is not directly subjected by the United Nations. Despite having a clear similarity with the 1540 Committee of the Security Council regarding the topics that they tackle, the OPCW is independent regarding its decision-making processes and with the directives and documents that its Executive Council releases. Nevertheless, as an IO, the OPCW has the endorsement of the United Nations, specifically the Secretary General and the Security Council, and is because of this guarantee that the OPCW has the duty to maintain a clear communication about its activities, mandates, inspections and beyond with the United Nations. It is also important to recall that as an IO, the OPCW is composed by States Parties, and this set of countries usually lead directives from the OPCW that lead to a Security Council resolution or even a General Assembly statement. (OPCW, n.d.)

Committee's Main Features

The OPCW has the main goal to oversee the global endeavor to permanently and verifiably eliminate Chemical Weapons. (OPCW, n.d.). With its 193 member States, the OPCW seeks to prevent chemistry from being used for warfare, thereby strengthening global security. To this end, the OPCW has four key provisions:

1. Destroying all existing chemical weapons under international verification by the OPCW.
2. Monitoring chemical industry to prevent chemical weapons from re-emerging.
3. Providing assistance and protection to states parties against chemical threats.
4. Fostering international cooperation to strengthen implementation of the convention and promote the peaceful use of chemistry. (OPCW, 2018)

Bearing these provisions in mind, the OPCW has the mission to implement the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention to achieve our vision of a world free of Chemical Weapons and the threat of their use, and in which chemistry is used for peace, progress, and prosperity. (OPCW, 1999)

Composition of the Committee

In order to achieve its mission and act upon the Chemical Weapons Convention, the OPCW has different organs that contain diverse functions among the organization. These are the Conference of the State Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, besides the subsidiary bodies which have specific functions.

The Conference of the State Parties (from now on CSP) is the principal and plenary organ of the OPCW, and its main function is to oversee the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, promote its goals, and review compliance with the treaty. It also oversees the

activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. (OPCW, n.d.)

On article VII of the CWC there are listed the functions and responsibilities of the CSP, and therefore, it is ensured that the CSP complies with the CWC, achieving one of the provisions of the OPCW.

It is important to bear in mind that the OPCW's member States are grouped into five geopolitical regional groups, which are used to determine the geographic representation of the Conference of the States Parties. The regional groups can also facilitate the coordination




Figure 1: Distribution of the State Parties of the OPCW by regional groups. (OPCW, 1997).

of strategic policy positions, and often form common blocks for negotiation on diverse topics and voting processes. (OPCW, n.d.)

The Executive Council is the governing body of the OPCW and is responsible for promoting the effective implementation of the convention and compliance with it. Set organ has 41 members which are elected by the CSP. (OPCW, n.d.)

The Executive Council therefore has the following functions:

1. Taking of measures in cases of non-compliance by a State Party, including the submission of recommendations for action to be taken by the Conference;
2. Considering and submitting to the Conference the draft OPCW programme and budget;
3. Considering and submitting to the Conference the draft report of the Organisation on the status of implementation of the Convention and the report of the Council on the performance of its activities;
4. Making a recommendation to the Conference on the appointment of the Director-General.

Nevertheless, the Council has some executive powers and other special roles in compliance with the CWC, which are listed in article VIII of the CWC.

The **Technical Secretariat** proposes policies for the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention to the Member States of the OPCW and develops and delivers programmes with and for them. (OPCW, n.d.) Also, the Technical Secretariat assists the Conference of the States Parties and the Executive Council in performing their tasks and carries out the Chemical Weapons Convention's verification measures. It also carries out other functions entrusted to it, stated in article VIII of the Convention as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference and the Council. (OPCW, n.d.)

The Technical Secretariat, due to its diverse functions,

has 11 divisions which are entrusted with a set of specific functions and an area of work. These are: Verification, Inspectorate, International Cooperation and Assistance, Secretariat for the Policy-Making Organs, External Relations, Office of Strategy and Policy, Office of Internal Oversight, Office of the Legal Adviser, Office of Confidentiality and Security, Health and Safety and Administration.

The Chemical Weapons Convention provides for the establishment of subsidiary bodies to aid the three main organs of the OPCW in their work. These are the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters, which advises both the Technical Secretariat and the States Parties on issues relating to the OPCW programme and budgets. The second is the Confidentiality Commission which settles disputes between States Parties related to confidentiality. Third is the Scientific Advisory Board entitled to assess relevant scientific and technological developments and reports to the Director-General. Finally, is the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach, which provides specialized advice in areas of education and outreach relevant to the Organisation's mandate. (OPCW, n.d.)

Committee's Functions

As mentioned before, the main goal of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is to oversee the global endeavor to permanently and verifiably eliminate all Chemical Weapons (OPCW, 2019). In order to effectively accomplish this goal, Party States created the CWC and the OPCW, the body in charge of ensuring the Convention be observed and implemented (OPCW, 2019).

If one wants to see the general goal on a more specific set of functions or obligations, the provisions can be mainly resumed in 8 points, as described by the OPCW (2019):

1. Elimination of all Chemical Weapons:

It is the main mission of the OPCW to ensure this. Under the OPCW's tutelage and supervision every stockpile of Chemical Weapons should be destroyed, in accordance to the regime and timelines the own States agree to upon signing and ratifying the treaty (OPCW, 2019).

2. Prevention of the re-emergence of Chemical Weapons:

OPCW is in charge of implementing different programs and guiding the Party States to ensure Chemical Weapons cannot reappear in any form, including in the hands of Non-State Actors (article I and II of the Convention specify both obligations of the State Parties and what constitutes a Chemical Weapon).

3. Support of national measures to implement the Convention:

Member States are bound by the Convention to implement actions to fulfill their commitment to the Convention (Article I and VII). It is also the duty of the OPCW to aid in any possible way the State parties that require help or assistance in such process (Articles VII, IX, X and XI).

4. Promotion of peaceful uses for chemistry through international cooperation:

Articles VI, IX and XI of the Convention aim to promote the peaceful use of chemistry by means of technical, technological, research and other forms of cooperation, within nations and also between them, as a way of preventing and eradicating nuclear weapons.

5. Assurance of preparedness:

The OPCW must work with State Parties to ensure that countries are able to stand, recover and react to a chemical weapon attack. Articles IX and X of the Convention discuss this obligation, but there are other additional protocols to the CWC that further develop the issue of countries' preparedness.

6. Response to the use of Chemical Weapons:

Articles IX, XII and XIV address the multiple responses the OPCW can take (there are other additional protocols where they are addressed more completely and comprehensively). These responses are varied and usually go stringed: they can range from a formal investigation to emergency aid for victims, which is another one of the OPCW's functions.

7. Support to the victims of Chemical Weapons:

The whole mission of the OPCW consists of ensuring that victims of Chemical Weapons are not only not revictimized but of assuring them that such a situation like the one they experienced will never repeat itself.

8. Universalization of the Convention:

Just as any Non-Proliferation Treaty, the ultimate goal is to universalize the Convention in order to effectively

Document released by the Committee

and truly fulfill the commitments contained within it. The OPCW as it stands does not have any sort of special document of its own, but it is important to bear in mind that the Executive Council often releases documents of its sessions and the format is quite similar to a Security Council resolution, with its preambulatory clauses and its operative clauses. However, it is important to take into account that the voting process of the document expelled by the committee would not be voted as a Security Council resolution and it does not count with its binding force, yet, it will have a standard procedure regarding the voting process.

The format of the document will be as it follows:

- 1. Conference of the State Parties Session #(number of the session)**
- 2. Date**
- 3. Topic**
- 4. Preambulatory Clauses (7 minimum)**
- 5. Operative Clauses (9 minimum)**

It is important to recall that there can be draft documents like a Working Paper that shows the advancement of the topic and the different solutions that you have proposed as blocks, but it is expected that by the end of the Committee there is just one unanimous document by the whole OPCW State Parties. Nonetheless, it is not mandatory to deliver a document, taking into account that diverse situations can be set in the committee and it is your duty as delegates to work together and propose and establish

solutions that go along with your country's interest and the committee's interest as well.

Furthermore, for major information regarding the interconnection procedure that will be managed on MUNEXT 2020, the reading of the Interconnection Guide, elaborated by Dynamization Undersecretary must be a priority within the preparation of each delegation.

Topic

Revision and regulation of Chemical Weaponry access by Non-State Actors (distribution, production and access).

Topic Introduction and Historical Evolution

In order to understand how Non-State groups have used Chemical Weapons and the current situation regarding such topic, it is important to first understand the history behind Chemical Weapons. Though Chemical Warfare may seem a relatively modern invention, it has existed for centuries: one of the first recorded uses of Chemical Warfare in the West was in 600 BCE, when the Athenian military poisoned the water supply of Kirrha, the city they were laying siege to, using poisonous hellebore plants (Everts, 2015). Throughout history, it is seen that Chemical Weapons are repeatedly used in war, by governments, belligerent groups and others; but that regardless of who uses them, these weapons, as well as Biological Weapons, have a common and particular denomination in almost all their time of existence: almost all types of society have viewed Chemical and Biological Weapons as unnecessarily cruel: an ancient Indian text, "The Laws of Mammu", prohibits the use of poison or fire arrows

(Manusmrti, Chapter 7, Verse 90).

Nevertheless, it is approximately in 1675 that the history of Chemical Warfare hits a significant landmark, that starts to foreshadow the current panorama of Chemical Warfare. In this year, France and Germany signed the Treaty of Strasbourg, the first international treaty prohibiting the use of Chemical Weapons in war, specifically, the use of poisoned bullets (OPCW, 2019). It was the first attempt at creating international regulation that acknowledged the damage Chemical Weapons could cause and that looked for a way to relieve it. It would take almost 200 years for another agreement like this one to appear: specifically, in 1874 the Brussels Convention on the Law and Customs of War prohibited any use of poison or poisoned weapons, as well as of any sort of weapon that caused unnecessary suffering (OPCW, 2019). Despite the goodwill behind it, the Convention never entered into force, since many governments refused to ratify it and make it a binding legal document.

In 1899, at the Hague Peace Conference the most important agreement regarding Chemical Weapons came into being: the Hague Convention established a prohibition to all contracting parties to use projectiles whose sole purpose was to diffuse “asphyxiating or deleterious gases” (Grojec and Coehlo, 2018). This Convention, along with the second Hague Convention of 1907, was the root of the movement against Chemical Weapons in the 20th century and defined the panorama of today’s approach to Chemical Warfare (OPCW, 2019).

Despite these notorious efforts, Chemical Weapons were heavily used in both World War I and II and developed and produced during the Cold War (Grojec and Coelho, 2018). This thriving of Chemical Weapons is due mainly to the fact that it was -and still is- accessible, cheap, easy to use and, since 1915, considered a weapon of mass destruction (Britannica, 2019).

The easy access, low cost and great damage it can cause has even led to dub Chemical Weapons “The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb”, an adequate moniker in the 20th century panorama, as well as today’s (North Atlantic Assembly, 1996). During World War I, notorious advances in Chemical Weapons were achieved: they became deadlier, easier to produce and cheaper to acquire. Chlorine gas, phosgene and mustard gas were deployed on both sides: it was the first time they were used as weapons of mass destruction, and they proved rather effective: 90,000 people were killed and around a million were injured (OPCW, 2019).

The terrible outcome of Chemical Warfare in World War I raised concern and outrage, spurring governments to opt for international instruments that may avoid a repetition of such events: this was the case of the Geneva Protocol adopted by the League of Nations in 1925, which explicitly prohibited the use of Chemical and Biological Weapons at war. This, however, did not prohibit the development, manufacturing and stockpiling of these, as the CWC does (Everts, 2015). As it was seen in practice, the Protocol was highly unsuccessful in its endeavor to end other chemical attacks (see figure).




Figure 2: General timeline of Chemical Weapons Usage. (Grojec and Coelho, 2018).

During World War II, Chemical Weapons were mainly used by Japan in China and by the Nazis in concentration camps, but they weren't used in European battlefields (Everts, 2015). The aftermath of the war and the Cold War saw an increase in investigation and development of Chemical Weapons, and though the second half of the 40's and the whole of the 50's saw a drastic reduction in the use of Chemical Weapons (there were two reported incidents), the 60's marked the beginning of a raise in the use of Chemical Weapons again by governments, especially against rebel forces. Despite these, it wasn't until 1978 that there was a reported use of chemicals from non-State actor with the purpose of causing harm (Johnston, 2017).

This was the infamous case of the mass suicide and forced death of 913 members (276 of these were children) of the People's Temple Cult in Jonestown, Guyana which marked the beginning of the age of Chemical Terrorism. This period of 1978-2016 reported around 20 different chemical attacks attached to belligerent groups outside the law: most were carried in the Middle East and the

victims were mostly civilians (Johnston, 2017). The majority of them were carried by religious extremist groups such as ISIS and have become a great concern on the eyes of the OPCW, who has been strengthening collaboration and emphasising on effectively understanding, preparing and responding to Chemical Terrorism: in 2018 the Organisation held the first Conference on Countering Chemical Terrorism, but as the own experts on the conference agreed: “there is still much research to do and action to take” (OPCW, 2018).

This period was also where most current international regulation regarding Chemical Weapons appeared. In 1972, the BWC (Biological Weapons Convention) was opened for signature: this convention marked an important predecessor on the CWC and contained an obligation for States to continue negotiations to ban the development, manufacturing and production of Chemical Weapons. However, these negotiations advanced in fits and starts and it wasn't until 1980 that the Conference on Disarmament established an ad-hoc commission for Chemical Weapons. This commission was in charge of creating a draft of a ban on Chemical Weapons. Thus appeared 4 years later an annual, provisional “rolling text” (OPCW, 2019) of what would be the base for the CWC. Different occurrences around the globe like the change in power dynamics during the 80's and the use of Chemical Weapons in the Gulf War helped to spur the negotiations forward until 1992, when a draft was finally adopted by the Commission and in 1993, the CWC was finally open to signature in the Conference in Paris, where 130 immediately signed it (OPCW, 2019). In this period as well, the Rome Statutes were adopted (1998), configuring the use of Chemical

Weapons as a war crime (Borea, 2015).

After this, the OPCW was established to fulfill the mandate of the CWC and develop the functions that it has been carrying since 1993. During this period of time the OPCW has been faced with several challenges including the threat of Chemical Terrorism, the use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State actors, the access to Chemical Weapons by different parties and the responsibility States have in these actions. It is in these issues the committee will be focus in order to create a stronger, more articulate and adequate regulation that will allow to effectively combat the different challenges the OPCW is now facing.

Topic Development

One of the most daunting challenges the OPCW is now facing is the participation of Non-State Actors in the prolonging of the existence of Chemical Weapons. The challenge of working with State Parties to eradicate chemical weapons has been met with various delays, but it has been mostly successful: 100% of declared Chemical Weapons facilities have been disabled, and around 90% of the world's Chemical Weapons stockpile has been destroyed (van Ham, van der Meer and Ellahi, 2017). Nevertheless, in recent years the rise in Chemical Terrorism and the incapacity of many States to enforce regulations on Chemical Weapons production and acquisition has complicated the panorama and become a major concern in the eyes of the OPCW: up to 2018, at least 70 State parties had not yet enacted comprehensive legislation regarding the implementation of the CWC (OPCW, 2018).

This is a particularly challenging topic because of its scope: facing the threat of Non-State Actors does not only involve a response from the OPCW but from several different UN organizations such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Security Council, the UNODC, etc. (OPCW, 2018).

So far, the OPCW efforts to work hand in hand with other agencies in the fight to end Chemical Terrorism has been well-intentioned, but very moderated in success: groups like the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism, a group specifically set up by the OPCW to combat Chemical Terrorism, have achieved impart landmarks such as the different ASSISTEX exercises, which consist in training exercises where possible Chemical Terrorism situations are planted, in order to evaluate and strengthen a country's response. These have contributed to build resilience and preparation for chemical terrorism attacks (van Ham, van der Meer and Ellahi, 2017), but many aspects of the threat of Chemical Terrorism and the acquisition, production and distribution of Chemical Weapons and potentially dangerous chemical material has not been fully addressed yet. This is something obvious even to plain sight: only until 2018 the OPCW hosted the first Conference on Countering Chemical Terrorism (OPCW, 2018).

One of the main concerns right now is to understand the motivations -the who, what and why (OPCW, 2018)- of Non-State Actors to use, acquire, produce and/or distribute Chemical Weapons. Little information has been retrieved on the subject: the OPCW has seen that religious extremist groups, apocalyptic cults and

left-wing belligerent groups are the most likely to engage in the use of Chemical Weapons, but that criminal networks are engaging more and more on the production and distribution of them, mainly due to the economic benefits they reported at doing so (OPCW, 2018). It was also shown that some of the reasons behind the use of these sort of weapons were the States' inability to enact and enforce appropriate legislation, easy access due to criminal networks and the search for asymmetrical warfare by these groups (OPCW, 2018).

This information however, is not as complete as it could be and little has been done with it: part of your duty in this committee is to determine how to better acquire and use information like these in order to build effective measures when countering the involvement of Non-State Actors in nuclear warfare, taking into account the current perspective and existing solutions.

So far, though critical and major points to build plans and projects have been identified, no clear strategy has been proposed by the OPCW: despite the fact that there are existing policy-support projects within the OPCW (OPCW, 2018), an updated and comprehensive set of guidelines to construct policies has not yet been released, most policy-support efforts are carried one-on-one. As of the matter, there has been a clear recognition that to avoid Chemical Terrorism in the chemical industry there needs to be a harmonic coordination between clear management and procedures, qualified personnel, site security, cybersecurity and secure supply chains, something policies are not exactly reflecting (OPCW, 2018). There are perhaps, noted exceptions of examples of how multiple

elements and organizations have combined to prevent Chemical Terrorism: one example is the Global Shield Initiative, which is composed by INTERPOL, WCO and the UNODC and has worked rather effectively in tracking and flagging the precursors of Chemical Weapons (its main purpose) to discover criminal networks focused on this sort of business (OPCW, 2018). This type of initiative throws some light as well on the necessity of a joint work and collaboration from States (not only national but local governments as well) and agencies in order to ensure the success on combating Chemical Weapons.

Legislation is also a critical point that must be addressed: both aimed at preventing proliferation, combating the illicit and adjudicating responsibility (OPCW, 2018). These three components must be structured to create an adequate legal framework to prosecute and prevent Chemical Warfare. Many countries endorse the creation of said legislation but fall in the trap of not enforcing it or of giving insufficient support or policies in order to ensure that they are enforced. This means that it is not only necessary that there are laws in place that condemn the use or proliferation of nuclear weapons, but that there is a necessity to have instruments that will allow these laws to be applied: for example, in the TTX case planted, there needs to be not only a legal framework comprising the response authorities must have to a chemical attack, but there must be the necessary manpower, equipment, training and resources for members of the public force, health infrastructure and others to respond to the crisis (Spencer, 2015).

Though many efforts to ensure this enforcement have

been taken, such as the creation of Regional CBRN training facilities (OPCW, 2018), this is an issue that still presents challenges in many developing countries which have a reduced State capacity and not enough resources to build such a complex infrastructure. This is where international collaboration and cooperation is vital: countries must work together and understand that this is a global issue which has repercussions on them if they do not aid more vulnerable States: as any illicit network, it expands and uses unsafe or vulnerable zones to transit to their destinations. Therefore, it is necessary that there be a crackdown in these so-called vulnerable territories. It has actually been contemplated the idea of creating a route map to concentrate on the areas where trafficking of illicit weapons can be easily stopped and where States require the most help to do so, so that international efforts can be wisely used, and a noticeable impact can be made.

Regarding this issue of lack of enforcement, one should also contemplate parallel to it the problem of accountability. If there is not a strong enforcement, government cooperation and ability to sanction those who engage in the use, acquisition, production or stockpiling of Chemical Weapons, there won't be a system that can actually hold accountable those who commit such illicit (OPCW, 2018). This is further complicated by the fact that many States have difficulty enforcing law in general. States that are considered "fragile", show low State capability in this issue which makes harder the creation of programs based on the presumption that countries will be able to enforce laws. Though there are many aspects of the fight against the use of chemical weapons by

Non-State actors that certainly escape the scope of legislation, there are also many more that can be and should be treated by each country's law and sovereignty.

During the last two decades, however, there has been a rising tide of doctrine under IHL that considers that Non-State Actors also have obligation in scenarios like these. Andrew Clapham, a renowned jurist of the topic poses that due to the level of organization belligerent groups have, due to the systematic violation of human rights that they commit, they can be held responsible for such acts (Bedi, 2014). It has even been a bigger point of debate within the Security Council if, in such cases where there is a clear incapability of the State to hold these individuals accountable, and there is a mass violation of norms of IHL, the international authorities should seize in first-hand such a case (Bedi, 2014). For the present case of Chemical Terrorism for example, the question would be if ISIS, a group who has committed several chemical attacks, and who operate in several countries that may have trouble enforcing law and prosecuting them, should be held responsible under IHL (Johnson, 2017).

As delegates, it is your duty to consider all of these issues and opt to find solutions for them: you may continue to expand and work upon the existing programs and projects, but it is also within your faculties to concentrate the efforts in a completely different direction than the one carried so far. You may also desire to establish a study case upon which to construct a framework, but such choices are at your discretion. Nevertheless, it should be strongly considered the ramifications of both options, as well as the capacity of the committee to take

on new projects or to cancel others, considering the incredible amount of resources, manpower, etc. that these spend.

Current Relevance of the Topic

Ever since the 9-11 attacks, Terrorism became the most important issue in international security among nations, with diverse efforts promoted by States and the United Nations in order to withstand the ongoing threat that it represents, and in this case, Chemical Terrorism mostly promoted by Non-State actors.

Reshmi Kahzi, an Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies in India, made a research regarding the correlation between Non-State Actors and non-conventional weapons, including Chemical Weapons and weapons of mass destruction. In said research, Kahzi established some factors for the development of Chemical Terrorism, and some are the technological development and availability of the raw materials for the creation of Chemical Weapons in the country of origin, the nature of the regime, internal disturbances in the region (civil war and internal conflicts), among others. (Jstor, PCADSSI, 2011) This research establishes the ongoing situation regarding the participation of Non-State actors and the implications of their status in the international community, taking into account the legal loophole that establishes its duties in international law.

Therefore, the regulation of Chemical Weapons access by Non-State actors is utterly relevant in the international

context due to the diverse angles and perspectives that this situation gathers around the globe. Nevertheless, the complexity of the matter does not represent the lack of research that governments and individual investigators have gathered. For instance, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom Government, made a statement at the at the Security Council Briefing on the 1540 Committee regarding the issue of Chemical Weapons and stated:

“Madam President, the 1540 Committee is an important cornerstone of the international non-proliferation architecture and as such, it’s a key part of the rules-based international system. The Committee plays a vital role in helping States prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to Non-State Actors and thus strengthening our collective efforts to deter and eradicate the use of these weapons” (UKGov, 2019).

As established by the UK government, the topic is clearly relevant because there is no clear document released by the United Nations that regulates the actions of Non-State actors, and therefore there is no instrument on International Law that can contain these set of actors regarding the use of Chemical Weapons.

It is clear that without an International Law instrument, there cannot be established some sort of binding nature to Non-State Actors. However, the OPCW in a conjoined effort with the United Nations, specifically with the Non-Proliferation Committee of the Security Council, has started to take the matter into the international spotlight. This ensures that the States Parties must respond for Non-State Actors operating in its country of

origin, and therefore this matter needs to be tackled in order to reach an international consensus regarding the applicability of law to these actors. (OPCW, 2017). In this order of ideas, in October 2017, in the 86th session of the Executive Council, there was the decision to address the threat posed by the use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors and declared that there are certain international obligations structured through customary law, international treaties and even the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The OPCW in a conjoined effort with the United Nations and the States Parties should reach a consensus in order to understand the role of the Non-State Actors regarding the misuse of chemistry and the creation of Chemical Weapons.

Glossary

Some definitions (like Chemical Weapons) are not contained within this glossary since they are present in the CWC. All terms defined by the Convention are not defined here, so if you need the definition of such terms check the CWC here:

https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CWC/CWC_en.pdf

CBRN: Acronym for chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear material that can cause harm in case of release, use, dissemination, etc. whether this release, use, dissemination, etc. is accidental or not. (UNODC, 2016)

Chemical Warfare: Chemical Warfare refers to the use of war techniques, strategies, etc. that involve Chemical Weapons (Everts, 2015)

Chlorine gas: Chlorine is a chemical element that may be found in gas and pressured into liquid for storage and shipment. It is commonly used in cleaning products, but it has also commonly been used as a Chemical Weapon due to its high toxicity (it reacts with water, creating acids that are corrosive and damage cells), cheapness and facility of acquisition. It is easily detectable as it does have a strong odor. (New York State Health, 2011)

CWC: Abbreviation for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) It is composed of a Preamble, 24 Articles, and 3 Annexes — the Annex on Chemicals, the Verification Annex, and the Confidentiality Annex. It is the most important international convention on Chemical Weapons and the founding document of the OPCW (OPCW, 2019).

Mustard gas: It is also known as mustard agent, mustard gas or by its military designations: H, HT and HD. It is composed of sulfur, chlorine, carbon and hydrogen, and can appear in any form: liquid, gas or solid. It smells like onions, garlic or mustard (it can be odorless too), which is why it is commonly known as mustard gas. This chemical weapon is a type of vesicant or blistering agent, since it blisters skin and mucous surfaces (like that of the lungs) upon contact. It is extremely deadly since it affects the chemical structure of DNA, causing illnesses like aplastic anemia (decreased production of blood cells) (CDC, 2018).

Phosgene gas: Phosgene is also known by its military designation CG and it is composed of carbon, oxygen

and chlorine. It is poisonous at room temperature, and though pleasant in smell in low quantities, a large dose of phosgene gas may have a strong, unpleasant smell. As a Chemical Weapon, it is used as a choking agent, irritating eyes, nose, throat, lungs, etc. and can cause pulmonary edema, heart failure and eventually death. This gas was responsible for most deaths related to chemical attacks in the first World War (CDC, 2018).

Stockpiling: In the case of this document, stockpiling refers to the practice of accumulating Chemical Weapons, precursors or toxic chemicals with the purpose of building an arsenal that can be used in future occasions.

QARMAS

1. Has your country ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention? If not, how can your country cooperate without being an active part of the CWC?
2. Does your country have a position regarding the institutionalization of a law that regulates the actions of Non-State actors? If not, what would it be?
3. Do countries should have accountability for the actions of Non-State Actors in their territory?
4. How can States regulate the misuse of chemistry and the regulation of prime components for the creation of Chemical Weapons in their territory?
5. Should chemical industries have a certain international regulation regarding the sale of chemical components to Non-State Actors?
6. Are Non-State Actors actions' in conflicted countries a matter of national and international security? How can States and the OPCW act upon this matter?
7. How should a country act along its foreign and interior

policy without going against its national companies and other non-state actors interests?

8. Does the OPCW work along with other organisms of the United Nations? Will it only be subjected to the Security Council?

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Orientation Manual for a United Nations Delegate.

Delegates,

In hopes of providing aid to your MUNEXT 2020 preparation and, fully aware that experience and knowledge is futile if not shared, from the United Nations Undersecretary, we have prepared various advices that might come in handy on the crucial stage of any delegate as it is, the research and investigation process previous to the Model

Preparation for the Delegation

- Know the foreign policy of the assigned delegation:
 - Consult sources such as the CIA World Factbook, the Model UN Research portal by Best Delegate, the country's official webpages, the country files prepared by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among others.
 - It is fundamental to know beforehand which countries are your potential allies and with which delegations you might have obstacles, it is a tool that guarantees facility when structuring alliances within the debate.
- Learn the geopolitical and economic situation of the delegation, having clarity in regards of:
 - Head of State.
 - Government's form (democracy, monarchy, presidentialism, etc.).
 - Economy's form.

- Economic issues (e.g. inflation).
- Understand the internal dynamics of your State, a good way to achieve that, is by the read of its constitutional text.

Preparation for the Committee

- Have a list of keywords or a glossary of the special technical concepts or terms that you will require in order to treat the committee's topic(s).
- Be mindful of the committee's purpose and the reasons that motivated its creation.
- Read the Resolution that founds the committee.
- San Francisco's Charter will be your greatest ally. Once you know the general scheme of the United Nations Organization, you will be able to understand and delimitate aspects such as the competences and functions of the committee in which you will work as delegate. The abovementioned will be useful too in order to comprehend those things you will be able to do and what you cannot as delegate.
- Have on your mind the development, the participation and the actions that your State has had within the correspondent committee.
- Make sure to have fully understatement of the interconnection dynamics of the committee in regards of other commissions within MUNEXT 2020, for such purposes, the reading of the Interconnection Guide is an essential must.

Preparation for Solution Proposals

- Answer to the guiding questions of your academic guide. They are designed to lead delegates in the most fundamental aspects of the committee and its topic. Remember that the final resolution must answer to such questions.
- Bear in mind the UN organs which can bear the burden the resolution poses.
- Splice at an international level any action which your delegation has taken, with a beneficial effect. To present results is important.
- Structure your solutions and specify in its management and achieving. Any proposal shall have fundament and an impactful structure.
- Interiorize your opening speech and further interventions rather than learning them by heart. It is possible that you forget the content. It is reasonable to have notes.
- Maintain yourself informed about the most important topics of the current international panorama.

Delegate's Preparation

- Have a list of keywords or a glossary of the special technical concepts or terms that you will require in order to treat the committee's topic(s).
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Tips for the OPCW

Additional to the abovementioned, there are some other recommendations that may be fruitful when approaching the committee: since this is a UN committee it is necessary to do some background research in UN generalities before approaching the topic. For this committee in particular, the Dais suggests:

- 1. Read the guide carefully and take notes about the specifics of the committee and the topic:** this is a must in any committee, and especially in one as technic as OPCW is. By consciously and thoroughly reading the guide you will find the topic easier to understand and research, since you will have starting points and a general knowledge that will help you to get to specifics in

a more precise way, and you will be able to deepen in what you may find the guide lacking or what will better aid you in committee.

2. Research verifiable sources and always promote the source. The best source of information are the OPCW's official sessions declarations, Executive Council Directives, Security Council's resolutions and documents from the Committee 1540 and direct statements from the assigned country. Research papers, thesis and articles in journals are also great source material that will allow you to come well-prepared and structure solutions on verifiable information. If there is a key part of any delegate's preparation process, is research.

3. Fully comprehend the structure and functioning of the OPCW, along with its subsidiary bodies and different departments. The OPCW page has different resources you can use to understand its job, functions, structure, etc. The guide as well provides a general understanding of this item.

4. Prepare your proposals regarding the 5 questions procedure: Why? How? When? Who? What? Your proposals should be structured in a comprehensible, concrete and complete way. It should be able to answer the problematic set in the committee, as well as logistical questions such as: how will it be funded? When will the proposal enter into force? Who will be in charge of monitoring?

5. Plan something that is tangible and reliable:

Perhaps what you proposed already exists, it is not uncommon for this to happen considering the many projects every UN body has at its charge. Try to innovate or even use what is already set: in this case is obvious how necessary it is a good research in order to use every means at your disposal, as well as avoiding recreating already existing solutions.

Finally, it is imperative that every single one of the delegates to be participating in MUNEXT 2020 remember that you count with all of the academic and logistic staff at your disposal, for the solution of any doubts or enquiries in order to fulfill the most important purpose: get Spread by MUNEXT!

Study Guide - Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

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